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 Every great theory is founded on a problem it cannot solve.1 For psychoanalytic 
criticism, that problem is Ophelia. Sigmund Freud’s Oedipal reading of Hamlet, mutually 
constitutive with his reading of Oedipus Rex, initiates the project of Freudian literary 
interpretation.2 But that reading must, by its most basic logic, displace Ophelia and render her an 
anomaly. If the Queen is Hamlet’s primary erotic object, why does he have another love interest? 
Why such a specific and unusual love interest? The answer that Freud and his disciples offer is 
that Hamlet’s expressions of love or rage toward Ophelia are displacements of his cathexis on 
the queen.3 That argument is tautological – one might as easily say that Hamlet displaces his 
cathected frustration with Ophelia onto the Queen – and requires that some evidence from the 
text be ignored — “No, good mother,” Hamlet tells the Queen, “here’s metal more attractive” 
(3.2.106) — but the idea of the Queen as Hamlet’s primary affective object remains a standard 
orthodoxy, common even in feminist Freudians’ readings of Hamlet. 4 Janet Adelman’s 
Suffocating Mothers, for example, takes the mother-son dyad as central, while Julia Reinhard 
Lupton and Kenneth Reinhard highlight the symbolic condensation of Ophelia with the Queen.5 
The argument for Ophelia as substitute object may reach its apotheosis in Jacques Lacan’s 
famous essay on Hamlet, which begins with “that piece of bait named Ophelia” only to use her 
         Marino/Ophelia’s Desire 
 2 
as an example of Hamlet’s estrangement from his own desire.6 
 Margreta de Grazia’s “Hamlet” without Hamlet has illuminated how the romantic 
tradition of Hamlet criticism, from which Freud’s own Hamlet criticism derives, focuses on 
Hamlet’s psychology at the expense of the play’s other characters, who are reduced to figures in 
the Prince’s individual psychomachia.7 While psychoanalytic reading objectifies all of Hamlet’s 
supporting characters, Ophelia is not even allowed to be an object in her own right. Insistently 
demoted to a secondary or surrogate object, Ophelia becomes mysteriously superfluous, like a 
symptom unconnected from its cause. Ophelia is the foundational problem, the nagging flaw in 
psychoanalytic criticism’s cornerstone. The play becomes very different if Ophelia is decoupled 
from the Queen and read as an independent and structurally central character, as a primary object 
of desire, and even as a desiring subject in her own right. 
 I do not mean to describe the character as a real person, with a fully human psychology; 
Ophelia is a fiction, constructed from intersecting and contradicting generic expectations.8 But in 
those generic terms Ophelia is startlingly unusual, indeed unique, in ways that psychoanalytic 
criticism has been reluctant to recognize. If stage characters become individuated to the extent 
that they deviate from established convention, acting against type, then Ophelia is one of 
Shakespeare’s most richly individual heroines. And if Shakespeare creates the illusion of 
interiority, or invites his audience to collaborate in that illusion, by withholding easy 
explanations of motive, Ophelia’s inner life is rich with mystery. Attention to the elements of 
Ophelia’s character that psychoanalytic readings resist or repress illuminates the deeper fantasies 
shaping psychoanalytic discourse. The literary dreams underpinning psychoanalysis are not 
simply to be debunked nor to be reconstituted, but to be analyzed. If, as the debates over 
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psychoanalysis over the last three decades have shown, much of Freudian thinking is not science, 
then it is fantasy, and fantasy, as Freud himself teaches, rewards strict attention. Ophelia, rightly 
attended, may tell us something about Hamlet, and about Hamlet, that critics have not always 
wished to know. To see Ophelia clearly would also make it clear how closely Hamlet resembles 
her and how faithfully his tragic arc follows hers. 
 
II: Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria  
 Perhaps the most striking absence in Freudian discussions of Ophelia is the lack of 
interest in Ophelia’s madness. Poetic madness is Freudian criticism’s raison d’etre. This lapse is 
all the more striking because Freud’s medical practice originally centered on the neuroses of 
“hysterical” young women. Psychoanalysis’s patient zero is Bertha Pappenheim, the privileged 
young hysteric known as “Anna O.,” and during the formative years when Freud was developing 
his basic theories he made much of his living by analyzing troubled women, Vienna’s Ophelias.9 
An intellectual project which began by investigating troubled women’s psychiatric symptoms 
leaves an iconic female character’s mental illness unexplored. Considerations of Ophelia’s mad 
scenes can be very scanty, sometimes no more than a single sentence. It is shockingly easy to 
publish a psychoanalytic account of Hamlet, such as Lacan’s, which ignores Ophelia’s madness 
completely.10 
 One reason for this lack of attention to Ophelia’s madness is that many critics, cathected 
upon Hamlet’s imagined subjectivity to the exclusion of all others’, have been interested only in 
Hamlet’s perception of Ophelia rather than in Ophelia herself. But the Ophelia of Acts One and 
Four operates independently of Hamlet’s gaze; the two characters share no dialogue in those 
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acts, and Hamlet never witnesses Act Four’s mad scenes. When Ophelia appears on stage 
without Hamlet, critical attention can lapse. Lacan goes so far as to pronounce Ophelia 
“completely null and dissolved as a love object” after Act Three’s “get thee to a nunnery” scene, 
only to be recuperated as an object of Hamlet’s desire after her death; Lacan takes virtually no 
interest in Ophelia’s mad scenes because in those scenes, according to Lacan, Ophelia is no 
longer an object of Hamlet’s desire.11 Lacan is interested only in one phrase related to Ophelia in 
Act Four, and that is Gertrude’s mention of “dead men’s fingers” (4.7.169), convenient to 
Lacan’s argument that Ophelia has symbolically become Hamlet’s phallus.12 Lacan, like most 
psychoanalytic critics, is not interested in an Ophelia who is imaginatively separate from the 
Queen or distinct from Hamlet’s imagination of her. An Ophelia who is outside Hamlet’s speech, 
not yet being described or interpellated by him, is forgettable, to be forgotten.  
 Lacan emphasizes Hamlet’s perspective so resolutely that he makes gross errors 
recounting Hamlet’s plot. According to Lacan, “we first hear Ophelia spoken of” in Act Two, 
Scene Two, when Polonius discusses her to the King and Queen, and “we first encounter 
Ophelia” in Act Two, Scene One, narrating her disturbing encounter with Hamlet.13 Lacan is not 
interested in remembering the Ophelia of Act One, just as he is not interested in thinking about 
the Ophelia of Act Four. Put another way, Lacan is interested in not remembering the Ophelia of 
Act One and so represses that Ophelia’s existence, simply erasing her first scene. What Lacan’s 
error serves to repress is an Ophelia whose courtship with Hamlet does not yet display signs of 
incestuous entanglement with the Queen nor the evidence of sexual disgust toward Ophelia that 
Freudians construe as a hallmark of that entanglement. The unproblematic wooing that Ophelia 
reports provides no help to the argument that Gertrude’s remarriage is the root of Hamlet’s 
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hostility toward Ophelia; such an argument requires that characters be credited with experiences 
outside the text. Although Hamlet’s first soliloquy expresses bitter displeasure with Gertrude’s 
remarriage, in the very next scene Ophelia reports what an effective wooer Hamlet is, “how he 
hath importuned [her] with love / In honourable fashion /.../ And given countenance to his speech 
... / With almost all the holy vows of heaven” (1.3.109–110, 112–13). Neither is Laertes 
concerned that Hamlet will woo Ophelia neurotically or self-destructively; he rather fears that 
Hamlet will woo too well (1.3.14–31). There is no sign in the text that Hamlet’s displeasure at 
Gertrude’s “wicked speed! To post / With such dexterity to incestuous sheets” (1.2.156–57) has 
yet become displaced onto Ophelia or begun to interfere with his courtship of her. 
 But at the beginning of Act Two, Hamlet’s addresses toward Ophelia have become 
catastrophically inappropriate, and remain so for the rest of the play. What the play shows taking 
place between Ophelia’s two descriptions of Hamlet, first as a persuasive lover and then as a 
melancholic in mute disarray, has nothing to do with mothers. What intervenes between those 
reports of Hamlet, as lover and as madman, is paternal authority: Polonius’s command to 
Ophelia and Hamlet’s encounter with the Ghost. There is a key structural parallel between 
Ophelia’s interview with Polonius and Hamlet’s interview with the Ghost, paired scenes that 
disrupt Hamlet and Ophelia’s erotic relationship and set each character’s tragic arc. Freudian 
readings make nothing of that parallel, just as they overlook Ophelia’s mad scenes. 
Psychoanalytic criticism is not interested in seeing structural resemblances between Ophelia and 
Hamlet. And yet Ophelia herself comes to resemble Hamlet as no other character in the play 
does. Only two characters in this play are mad.  
 Hamlet’s resemblance to his male foils, Laertes and Fortinbras, fellow avengers of slain 
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fathers, is a critical bromide. But to note Hamlet’s resemblance to Ophelia, his fellow in 
madness, is quite rare. To understand a play’s representation of madness by examining another 
representation of madness in the same play is perhaps too obvious an exercise. Certainly, 
psychoanalytic readings take every possible route around this obvious path. Sigmund Freud 
manages it by never writing a full explication of his theory of Hamlet, central though that theory 
is to the rest of his intellectual system; Freud’s discussions of Hamlet always come as an 
apparent digression or aside, sometimes literally as a footnote. He left the full prosecution of his 
argument to followers such as Ernest Jones, who anxiously and insistently decouples Hamlet’s 
madness from Ophelia’s: 
the dramatic effect produced by Hamlet’s personality and 
behaviour ... would be quite other were ... [he] to represent merely 
a ‘case of insanity.’ When that happens, as with Ophelia, such a 
person passes beyond our ken, is in a sense no more human, 
whereas Hamlet successfully claims our interest and sympathy to 
the very end. Shakespeare certainly never intended us to regard 
Hamlet as insane, so that the ‘mind o’erthrown’ must have some 
other meaning than its literal one.14   
Note here that Shakespeare’s language may be cast aside, its literal meaning cast in doubt, if it is 
also Ophelia’s language. Ophelia is discounted as a witness. 
 Feminist critics have rebutted Jones by taking Ophelia’s madness as both human and 
interesting, but in so doing have conceded a crucial point to Jones. By gendering Ophelia’s 
madness, critics as brilliant as Carol Thomas Neely and Elaine Showalter continue to promote 
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the idea that Hamlet and Ophelia’s maladies are fundamentally unlike. Neely claims that 
Hamlet’s “madness is in every way contrasted with” Ophelia’s, denying that Hamlet is mad at all 
while comparing Ophelia’s condition to “hysteria.”15 Neely does not only take a maximalist 
position in the debate over the extent of Hamlet’s madness, but ignores Ophelia’s testimony — 
and for that matter Hamlet’s, including his description of his madness as “poor Hamlet’s enemy” 
(5.2.217)  — in order to preserve a radical distinction between the characters. Readings such as 
Showalter’s and Neely’s construe the Ophelia of the mad scenes as a powerful voice from the 
play’s margin, but Ophelia is only marginal because critics have marginalized her. If critics 
approached Ophelia’s madness as seriously as they approached Hamlet’s, they would be forced 
both to imagine Ophelia as an independent character, separate from Hamlet’s perceptions of her 
and firmly at the play’s center. Ophelia could no longer be read as merely an extension of 
Hamlet nor as a refraction of the Queen’s image in his mind, but as a full counterpart, who acts 
and suffers as Hamlet suffers and acts. Hypotheses about Hamlet’s madness that excluded 
Ophelia’s would require explanation and defense. And if Ophelia’s madness were understood as 
the mirror of Hamlet’s, critics might be forced to acknowledge how much Hamlet mirrors 
Ophelia. 
 Perhaps most importantly, Freudian critics giving serious consideration to Ophelia’s 
madness would need to give serious consideration to Ophelia’s desire. For Freud locates the 
heart of all neurosis, the root of humanity’s discontent, in our uneasy relationship with our own 
desires. Every dream, Freud teaches, is a concealed wish; the engines of our neuroses are our 
own unacknowledged needs and drives. Freud’s account of Hamlet’s madness centers on what 
Hamlet desires but cannot accept desiring. If one accepts Ophelia’s madness as something as real 
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and as interesting as Hamlet’s madness, as something fully human, one must consequently ask 
the question, “What does this woman want?”  
 
III: Taboo and Emotional Ambivalence   
 Ophelia seems to express few desires, and many critics have read her as passive. But not 
getting what one wants is where every psychoanalytic story begins, and few characters are better 
than Ophelia at not getting what she wants. Ophelia is unique among daughters in Shakespeare, 
the only such character who does not attain the lover whom her father forbids. What is 
exceptional about Ophelia, generically sui generis, is typically obscured by discussing her as if 
she were a real person, governed by the laws of history and plausibility. It was normal and 
unremarkable for daughters in Shakespeare’s England or in medieval Denmark to obey a father 
and thus deny a lover. But Ophelia is fictional, not governed by the laws of nations nor of nature 
but by literary convention. In an Elizabethan or Jacobean playhouse, the conventional result of 
Polonius’s command should be Ophelia’s elopement. An early modern stage father forbidding 
his daughter to see her lover is essentially reading the first of the banns of marriage. This rule is 
most obvious in comedy, but also clearly in force in tragedy, as in the cases of Baptista and 
Capulet, and no daughter, even in the comedies, has a father more comic than Ophelia’s. This is 
an instance where Hamlet’s hyper-canonical status, its tendency to exist for modern readers in 
the always-already, makes it difficult to see how unconventional the play is. An early modern 
playgoer watching Act One, Scene Three of Hamlet, a ridiculous old man telling his daughter to 
break off her love affair, would entertain no doubts about what would happen next, but that is not 
what happens next. 
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 Ophelia does not desire in the way that a natural person does. But she has a conventional 
telos, a normative ending toward which her dramatic type is expected to move, an outcome 
which the character, as a formal component of the play, is understood to be seeking. Avengers 
move toward revenge, rivals for the throne strive to become king, and unmarried young ladies 
move toward marriage with a socially and sexually appropriate partner. This formal telos 
dovetails with a set of prescriptive cultural expectations for the character’s age, class, and 
gender. Young ladies such as Ophelia are also presumed to prefer young gentlemen as marriage 
partners and to be repulsed by old men, commoners, and fools; paternal interdiction is either 
counterproductive or moot. The stage puella is governed by a generic standard of sexual desire 
and distaste. (Freud inscribes similar normative desires on his unmarried female patients, but 
presumes their sexual attraction to older men rather than to age peers.)16 Precisely because 
Ophelia is not a biological person but a stage type, she can be presumed to possess a stereotyped 
set of desires, drives, and erotic preferences. Those desires help constitute her dramatic identity 
as surely as Polonius is constituted by his follies or the Clown by his fooling. And precisely 
because Ophelia is a character rather than a person, her choice of obedience must be read as 
vividly unusual, inviting the viewer to speculate about her emotional state. Ophelia makes only 
one clear decision in Hamlet, the decision to obey her father and deny her own desires, but that 
decision is radical and ultimately disastrous. Ophelia’s sacrifice of her erotic drive marks her as 
entirely out of the ordinary. Her obedience to her father is disobedience to the laws of genre. And 
her refusal of her desires is her character, just as Hamlet’s delay of his revenge is his. 
 Ophelia’s originals in Shakespeare’s sources, Belleforest and Saxo Grammaticus, display 
none of her self-destructive compliance. In Saxo and Belleforest, an unnamed young woman is 
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set to trap Amleth into sex in order to test whether or not he is mad. (These narratives presume 
that a Hamlet-figure capable of acting on his sexual drives would therefore also be capable of 
taking his revenge and seizing the crown; sexual desire, political ambition, and aggression are 
imagined as intertwined and inseparable.) The nameless proto-Ophelia not only warns Amleth so 
that he does not betray himself, but colludes with him to find a discreet place where they can 
couple unobserved.17 (This lover is distinct from the two wives whom the chronicle-history 
Amleth later bigamously marries.) Hamlet and Ophelia’s originals are willful, direct, and 
uninhibited; Hamlet and Ophelia are distinguished instead by how much they do not do. 
 Ophelia’s self-abnegation is so powerful that she not only refuses Hamlet but also serves 
as Polonius’s pawn against him, directly reversing both the chronicle-history sources and the 
usual dramatic expectations. A daughter helping her father deceive her lover rather than the other 
way around is a shocking perversion of theatrical convention. It simply is not done. The “get thee 
to a nunnery” dialogue plays out against the backdrop of this inverted stage triangle, with the 
doddering father who should be gulled by his daughter and her lover instead spying from behind 
a curtain while his daughter attempts to gull her lover. Ophelia’s plaint “I was the more 
deceived” (3.1.119), seems especially inappropriate in this context, a displacement of who, in her 
dialogue with Hamlet, is “the more deceived.” Moreover, Ophelia’s unprecedented collusion 
with Polonius enables the very behavior, eavesdropping on Hamlet, that leads to Polonius’s 
death. The repeated image of Polonius hiding behind the curtain could not be clearer. Ophelia 
abets Polonius in the enterprise that eventually kills him. If Ophelia cannot be credited with 
feelings of guilt, ambivalence, or internal conflict here, then no character in Hamlet can, 
including Hamlet himself. Hamlet’s obedience to his father stems from that father’s death; 
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Ophelia’s obedience to her father helps lead, however indirectly, to that father’s death. 
 Ophelia’s radical denial of desire should be intensely interesting to psychoanalytic 
criticism. After all, psychoanalysis identifies sexual repression, and perhaps most of all women’s 
sexual repression, as the fundamental wellspring of neurosis. From that perspective, the price of 
Ophelia’s denial must be steep, its consequences dire. Hamlet surely senses trouble in Ophelia’s 
unprecedented obedience to her father, taking it both as disloyalty on Ophelia’s part and as 
aggression on Polonius’s. He twice addresses Polonius as “Jephthah,” the Judge of Israel who, in 
fulfillment of a poorly-worded vow to Yahweh, sacrificed his only daughter as a burnt offering 
(2.2.339, 2.2.346).18 Jephthah was well known to early audiences from a popular ballad and from 
a play by a rival acting company.19 The allusion has been noted by several scholars, most 
recently by Cameron Hunt McNabb.20 Indeed, the allusion to Jephthah is more textually durable 
than Polonius’s own name. Even in the First Quarto and in the truncated German adaptation Der 
bestrafte Burdermord, both of which call the old man “Corambis,” he is called Jephthah.21 That 
the reference survives in the highly corrupt German adaptation suggests something about its 
legibility and perceived importance. Hamlet identifies Ophelia with Jephthah’s daughter, a figure 
of such filial obedience that she agrees to death at her father’s hand, and he implicitly accuses 
Polonius of murderous paternal aggression.  
 To be like Jephthah, here, is to strive at all costs to preserve a daughter’s virginity, not 
simply until marriage but until death. The Book of Judges specifies that Jephthah’s daughter 
“knew no man” (Judg. 11:39), that she died a virgin. One of the many verbal cruelties of the “get 
thee to a nunnery” scene is that Hamlet is continuing this Biblical allusion. Before Jephthah’s 
daughter was sacrificed, she was allowed to withdraw for two months of seclusion with a group 
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of other unmarried women to “bewail [her] virginity” (Judg. 11:38). To enter a nunnery is to be 
like Jephthah’s daughter by renouncing one’s sexuality and fertility, but also to prepare for 
murder by one’s father. 
 
IV: A Neurosis of Demoniacal Possession in the Seventeenth Century    
 Hamlet, like Ophelia, accepts his own sacrifice at his father’s hands. His central tragic arc 
is simply a longer and more elaborate rehearsal of Ophelia’s briefer, more elemental tragedy. Her 
display of radical obedience to her father is immediately followed by his display of the same 
catastrophic and unwavering filial piety. Hamlet makes his own version of Ophelia’s choice, but 
Ophelia is shown making it first. Polonius’s command that his daughter deny a princely suitor is 
followed hard upon by the Ghost’s command that the Prince sacrifice his ambitions and his life. 
And like Ophelia, Hamlet obeys a father who prefaces his commands with lengthy orations that 
badly undermine his paternal authority. Polonius’s long-winded speeches establish his comic 
folly, but the Ghost’s yet-longer-winded speeches establish his profound spiritual jeopardy, 
making it clear that he is no “spirit of health” (1.4.40). He, like Polonius, is not a father to be 
obeyed.22 
 The Ghost does not explicitly require his son’s death when he requires his services. But it 
is worth paying attention to what the Ghost does not say. He commands his son to revenge him, 
but not to succeed him. Nothing is spoken of the younger Hamlet becoming King. And the 
generic constraints of early modern revenge tragedy foreclose the possibility. The Amleth in the 
source texts, a creature of chronicle history, could avenge his father and achieve the throne. But 
the rules of early English revenge tragedy do not permit any avenger, any regicide, to take the 
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crown. In almost every case, the avenger must expiate his regicide with his life; the single 
notable exception, Marston’s Antonio, renounces the throne to live in a monastery.23 By 
accepting his father’s command, Hamlet implicitly agrees to sacrifice his life, his soul, and his 
future kingship. The Ghost, speaking only of the past and of the duties young Hamlet owes to 
that past, says nothing of survival or succession. “The serpent that did sting thy father’s life,” he 
tells Hamlet, “Now wears his crown” (1.5.39–40). In the Ghost’s language, the crown is still his, 
the older Hamlet’s and not the younger’s. It is not “thy crown,” not Hamlet’s, not the Prince’s 
rightful inheritance. The dead man has not relinquished his claim upon it. 
 Nor should we be surprised. The Ghost is Senecan, and Seneca’s ghosts have a habit of 
demanding and reveling in the deaths of their own heirs and the extinction of their bloodlines. 
Seneca’s Thyestes opens with Tantalus’s ghost being tasked to plague his line to destruction; 
Agamemnon begins with Thyestes’s Ghost relishing the imminent bloodletting of his 
descendants.24 And then, of course, there is the Ghost of Laius, Oedipus’s father, whom I quote 
from Alexander Nevyle’s Elizabethan translation of Seneca’s Oedipus:  
  But I thee, thee that Scepter holdst, thy Father wil pursue, 
  And wreacke my selfe on thee and thyne with plagues and vengeance due. 
  ... 
  I wil subvert thy Houses cleane, for this thy lothsome lust: 
  I wil do this thou wretch: And thee, and thyne consume to dust.25 
Here Laius does not merely desire Oedipus’s death, which Laius has sought since Oedipus was a 
baby, but also the deaths of all Oedipus’s descendants. That this would leave Laius too without 
descendants seems to be his primary goal. Senecan ghosts, the household gods from hell, 
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habitually urge the end of their own family lines.     
 But the story of the king who wishes no heirs is far older than Seneca; in Greek 
mythology, long before Laius was a ghost in Latin drama, he was dedicated to ending his own 
family line. Laius exposes his only child on the sacred mountain and takes pains to get no 
others.26 The tale is a familiar one; the Oedipus story, which Freud posits as universal, is actually 
quite rare in Western folklore, but stories of kings like Laius are pervasive. A king, often 
prompted by an oracle or prophecy, becomes murderously hostile to a male child or to a younger 
man whom he perceives as his successor. Saturn swallows his children; King Amulius exposes 
his great-nephews Romulus and Remus; Herod seeks the newborn King of the Jews augured by 
the star; Saul yearns for the death of the anointed David.27 Several more stories of this type were 
known in early modern England; of course, a still larger number of tales, unknown to the 
English, were distributed throughout the Indo-European world. But a murderous or rebellious 
son seldom appears in these stories. The early Freudians’ attempts to collect and categorize 
Oedipus tales, spearheaded by Otto Rank, are actually collections of Laius stories, filled with 
violence against sons.28 The lack of parricidal violence in these stories is explained as repression 
of taboo impulses; the proliferation of filicidal violence is explained as a projection of filial 
hostility. Freud reads Hamlet, the story of a son who casts away his life in filial obedience, as a 
model story of filial rebellion.    
 Old Hamlet’s Ghost does not explicitly desire that his family line be destroyed, but he 
implicitly demands it. The dead king has two male heirs, his brother and his son. He sends the 
second to kill the first. As David Lee Miller puts it, “the ghost of the dead king seems more than 
willing to sacrifice his living son in the name of revenge.”29 And young Hamlet, as an obedient 
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son, renounces his future. Hamlet’s greatest resemblance to Sophocles’s Oedipus is to the figure 
at the end of Oedipus Rex, accepting the judgment of the dead and relinquishing his claims to 
kingship. The possibility that Hamlet might take the throne himself is never spoken of again, just 
as Ophelia and her father cease to speak of love or marriage. The life path for which Hamlet was 
born (or rather the socially and dramatically expected telos for such a character), becomes 
something repressed, unthinkable and unspeakable. The Ghost’s explicit command to revenge 
seems to carry an implicit taboo against succession and inheritance, something Hamlet 
internalizes almost immediately. “Oh cursèd spite / That ever I was born,” Hamlet says shortly 
after their encounter (1.5.186–87), wishing that his father’s bloodline had already ended. 
 Hamlet’s self-sacrifice, and the end of Old Hamlet’s family line, also demands the 
sacrifice of any life with Ophelia. Hamlet’s encounter with the Ghost ruptures Hamlet and 
Ophelia’s erotic relationship as surely as Polonius’s intervention does, because it renders 
Ophelia’s love impossible for Hamlet to accept. To embrace Ophelia, with “love / In honorable 
fashion,” (1.3.109–110) would mean committing to continue the life Hamlet has foresworn. 
Ophelia, whom the Queen “hoped” would “have been my Hamlet’s wife” (5.1.233), represents 
the danger of maturity and fatherhood, the assumption of royal and paternal authority which 
Hamlet treats as taboo. Ophelia is most thoroughly unacceptable because she represents 
generativity and fertility, the possibility of yet more heirs in Old Hamlet’s line. “Why wouldst 
thou be a breeder of sinners?” he demands. “[I]t were better my mother had not borne me” 
(3.1.120–24). Old Hamlet already has one heir too many. 
 The “To be or not to be” soliloquy is striking for how stubbornly Hamlet refuses to 
imagine himself as a potential king or as his murdered father’s heir. The speech, posing itself as 
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a dilemma, excludes Hamlet’s actual choices.30 The life of a King of Denmark might be 
“weary,” but he is not required to “grunt and sweat” (3.1.76). Nor, surely, will Hamlet ever be 
expected, either as King or Prince, to “fardels bear” (3.1.75). Henry V in soliloquy may imagine 
the laboring peasant’s life as happier than a king’s, but Hamlet simply imagines himself a 
laboring peasant and not a prince.31 Hamlet’s list of ills that the living must suffer, the “whips 
and scorns of time,” is — with the key exception of “disprized love” — entirely composed of 
problems foreign to Hamlet’s station: “The oppressor’s wrong, the proud mans contumely, / ... 
the law’s delay, / The insolence of office and the spurns / That patient merit of the unworthy 
takes” (3.1.69–73). Although Hamlet does have a great many problems, he does not have these 
problems. Treated with deference even by enemies, Hamlet never suffers the proud insolence of 
local Osrics. He does not lack patronage. He is not oppressed by his landlord. And he has not 
been stymied by a slow-moving lawsuit. One might, with ingenuity and some brute force, try to 
apply some of these phrases to Hamlet’s relationship to the King, but even then most of the 
specific details are fantastic. Moreover, if the King were the problem, the King could be 
replaced. The aptness with which Shakespeare typically fits his characters’ speech to their station 
is mysteriously absent from this soliloquy. The details are concrete and specific but entirely 
irrelevant to the character speaking. Their irrelevance is the point. Hamlet’s famous shift to 
abstraction and putative universality in the “To be or not to be” speech, the sudden disappearance 
of the pronoun “I,” is part of the speech’s occlusion of Hamlet’s own situation, the erasure of the 
concrete perils and possibilities he faces. The “heartaches and thousand natural shocks that flesh 
is heir to” are not all to which Hamlet is heir, but he refuses to imagine inheriting those things 
which are specifically and personally his own. And of the problems he enumerates, only the 
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problem of Ophelia, the problem of “disprized love” is real. The universal, philosophical 
perspective Hamlet favors, which has in turn won Hamlet enormous favor with the critics, might 
instead be read as a defense mechanism. Hamlet universalizes and intellectualizes in order to 
avoid more immediately pressing questions. 
 Hamlet’s discussion of death in “To be or not to be” is likewise inappropriate. The 
famous description of death as “The undiscovered country from whose bourn / No traveler 
returns” (3.1.78–79) is lovely and almost universally apt, except for Hamlet himself. If no 
traveler returned from the undiscovered country’s bourn, then Hamlet would have no Act One.32 
Hamlet’s professed mystification about the “something after death,” the “ills ... that we know not 
of” (3.1.77, 80–81), only represents further self-deception. Hamlet cannot plead ignorance of the 
afterlife, having recently met a Ghost released from a prison house of torment. While that Ghost 
has not been forthcoming about details, Hamlet has been given a reasonable sense of the 
attendant ills. He can thus be quite confident that taking his revenge will lead him in turn to the 
torments of Purgatory, if not to Hell itself. Yet Hamlet persists in describing the afterlife as 
speculative and hypothetical. His lines “to die, to sleep – / No more” (3.1.59–60), ignore the 
character’s actual experience of the dead. The soliloquy’s disingenuous rhetoric begins with the 
renowned opening words, because “To be” and “not to be” (3.1.55) do not represent the only 
choices; Hamlet’s encounter with the Ghost, gone but not departed, confounds the categories of 
life and death, being and not-being, and makes such simple binaries untenable. The most famous 
speech in Hamlet is strangely disconnected from the rest of Hamlet. It represses both Hamlet’s 
knowledge of sin and damnation and the possibilities that life might hold for him.  
 The “To be or not to be” soliloquy can be better read as persuasive rhetoric, an oration 
         Marino/Ophelia’s Desire 
 18 
through which Hamlet seeks to sway himself. Rather than attempting to choose between equally 
balanced possibilities, Hamlet makes a concerted case for death over life, repeatedly tilting the 
scale in death’s favor. He has come a long way from his first soliloquy’s wish “that the 
Everlasting had not fixed / His canon ‘gainst self-slaughter” (1.2.131–32). The Christian 
prohibition on suicide is no longer mentioned. But in Hamlet’s first soliloquy, explicit authority 
commands him to live and thus excuses survival; the canon of the Everlasting permits Hamlet to 
articulate a wish he cannot enact, and lets him frame his survival as Christian obedience. In 
Hamlet’s third soliloquy, God’s commands are excluded from consideration, and Hamlet strives 
to frame his will to the Ghost’s implicit commands. Hamlet maximizes the difficulty of life, 
enumerating burdens and struggles that he himself will never face, and minimizes the 
consequences of sinful death, reducing the spectacular warning he has received to a mere set of 
speculative uncertainties. Hamlet is not passively indecisive, but actively attempting to talk 
himself out of his life. It is striking, considering how thoroughly Hamlet has stacked the 
rhetorical deck against survival, that he does not succeed. The desire to survive may be disowned 
and disavowed, but evidently has not yet been dispelled. Hamlet is not suicidal, but believes that 
he ought to be. In his most famous soliloquy, he exhorts himself to embrace death and thus to 
satisfy his ghostly father’s demands. The closing line of the speech proleptically imagines 
Hamlet himself as dead and Ophelia as a votary praying for his soul: “in thy orisons / Be all my 
sins remembered” (3.1.88–89). Hamlet will have need of Ophelia’s intercessory prayers if he 
joins his father in the guilt of Purgatory. At the moment when he physically moves to join 
Ophelia on stage, his language betrays his psychological union with the Ghost.   
 Hamlet can only imagine his relationship with Ophelia in the past or else in the future 
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anterior, a future in which Hamlet himself has become irretrievably part of the past. He prefers 
the vision of Ophelia remembering him to the vision of Ophelia living with him. His command 
that she get herself to a nunnery, beyond its ominous allusions to the Jephthah story, is quite 
literal. The act he prefers to imagine Ophelia undertaking is intercessory prayer, those prayers 
that the saved do not need and the damned cannot use.33 More seriously, he can imagine no 
sexual future for her but a pejorative one; he will not marry her and he refuses to imagine her 
with another legitimate partner. “I say we will have no more marriage” (3.1.145) adopts the 
Ghost’s apocalyptic perspective, envisioning an end to future generations. But it also absolves 
Hamlet from a choice he refuses to make, a choice between accepting Ophelia or relinquishing 
her to another. Ophelia’s hand is like the Danish crown, a prize that Hamlet will not take but 
wishes no one else to have. And, perhaps most tellingly of all, Hamlet’s imagination casts 
Ophelia playing the role toward him that he himself plays toward the Ghost: remembering a 
guilty but beloved soul. As Marjorie Garber has pointed out, the Ghost’s command “Remember 
me” (1.5.91) is transformed in Hamlet’s command, “Be all my sins remembered” (3.1.89) and 
then into Ophelia’s command “Pray you, love, remember” (4.5.170): a chain of injunctions not 
simply to remember the dead, but to cherish the arguably damned.34  
 Ophelia responds to Hamlet’s plea to be remembered by returning “remembrances” to 
him (3.1.92); the echo could not be closer. In effect, Ophelia is negating the memory of their 
love affair, in an attempt to sanitize or erase their shared past. And the Ghost haunts this scene 
far more terribly and effectively than he haunts the later scene in Gertrude’s closet. The Ghost 
has indoctrinated Hamlet in an emotional logic which not only prioritizes the past but construes 
any “disloyalty” to that past as invalidating or nullifying former intimacies. “If thou didst ever 
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thy dear father love” (1.5.23), the Ghost begins, implying that present disobedience annuls past 
filial affection. For Hamlet to deny the Ghost’s command would, by this logic, not simply mean 
that he has ceased to love his father, but that he has retroactively ceased to have loved his father, 
that the love he once felt will not only cease to exist but to cease having existed; refusal to follow 
his father’s script will rewrite the past, erasing emotional experiences Hamlet once cherished. 
Hamlet will not simply forget them; they will cease to have happened. 
 Primed by the Ghost to fixate on the past’s emotional integrity and to see changing 
relationships as threats, Hamlet responds to Ophelia’s return of remembrances as a fundamental 
attack. “I never gave you aught” (3.1.95) is a denial of the relationship’s previous existence, 
precisely the emotional punishment with which the Ghost has threatened Hamlet. Hamlet’s cruel 
word games with Ophelia, his self-retracting “I did love you once ... I loved you not” (3.1.114, 
118), rehearse and replay his own indecision about the Ghost, the doubts and cavils he cannot 
directly express: whether to affirm the past, static and unchanging, and so be bound to sacrifice 
his future on that past’s behalf, or to deny that past, nullifying its claims on him in order to 
liberate himself into the future.  
 For Ophelia and Hamlet, flawlessly obedient to flawed fathers, the past conquers the 
present. Indeed, both Ophelia and Hamlet seem incapable of discussing their emotions in the 
present tense. Hamlet’s response to Ophelia’s rejection is “I did love you once.” Hamlet’s 
rejection of Ophelia is “I loved you not.” Whether he does or does not love Ophelia now is 
something he never articulates, perhaps never accesses. “Do” and “do not” have been displaced 
by “did” and “did not.” Ophelia too, enjoined by her father from continuing the romance, can 
only speak of love in the past tense: “you know right well you did,” “you made me believe so,” 
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“I was the more deceived” (3.1.96, 115, 119). The nunnery scene becomes the most bizarre of 
lover’s quarrels, wrangling not over whether or not the couple loves one another but over 
whether or not the couple formerly loved one another. The dialogue goes so poorly because 
Ophelia and Hamlet are so emotionally well-matched, so identically committed to filial loyalty 
and to self-denial; these characters are, quite literally, made for one another. They are so unable 
or unwilling to discuss their desires that they cannot even manage to deny loving each other in 
the present. They do not permit themselves, are not permitted, to consider any emotional reality 
except that of the past. 
 Hamlet escalates and concludes the nunnery scene by moving beyond Ophelia as an 
individual object of love or rage to a more universalized set of complaints about womankind: 
“God hath given you one face and you make yourselves another” (3.1.142–43), slipping from the 
singular to the plural in mid-sentence as he shifts to an indictment of Ophelia’s entire gender. As 
in the “To be or not to be” speech, Hamlet moves evasively from concrete specifics to a set of 
commonplaces with no special relevance to the object, or the subject, he is nominally discussing. 
Rather than consider his own particular fate, he generalizes about the lot of the common man; 
rather than consider Ophelia, he generalizes his rant to womankind. The discourse of misogyny, 
which denies meaningful differences between individual women, provides Hamlet refuge from 
the emotional threat posed by any particular woman’s love. Hamlet’s universalizing strategy of 
repression or evasion continues until he is standing at Ophelia’s grave, unaware it is hers: “Now 
get you to my lady’s table and tell her, let her paint an inch thick, to this favour she must come” 
(5.1.182–84), with “my lady” still a universal, proverbial lady. Only when Hamlet understands 
that this is indeed his lady’s grave is his ambivalence toward Ophelia resolved. Standing in her 
         Marino/Ophelia’s Desire 
 22 
grave, he is free to declare his love unequivocally, because that relationship has moved 
unequivocally into the past and no longer threatens any fertile future. “I loved Ophelia” (5.1.258) 
becomes a simple declaration in the past tense. His triangular relationship with his two most 
important affective objects, Ophelia and the Ghost, has been resolved. Ophelia no longer 
threatens his relationship with the Ghost, no longer poses the danger that Hamlet might be 
tempted to live. Instead both love objects become safely aligned, figures of the past for whom 
Hamlet’s love, because completed, can be considered perfect. And again, as Hamlet moves 
physically onstage toward Ophelia’s body, his language identifies him with his father’s spirit: 
“This is I, / Hamlet the Dane” (5.1.246–47), using his spectral father’s royal title.    
 
V: The Taboo of Virginity       
 And what of Ophelia’s conflicts over Hamlet? What of her own unaccepted desires, 
deferred and disowned? The death of Polonius brings her into still closer parallel with Hamlet. 
The father to whom she is unbendingly obedient is dead. Her primary erotic object is, on her 
father’s account, now utterly taboo; the man who killed her father cannot become her husband, 
cannot be openly desired as a husband. Any desire for Hamlet becomes, necessarily, 
unacceptable and unthinkable. And her state is even more dire than Hamlet’s precisely because 
her dead father no longer speaks to her, gives her no dread commands. The selflessly obedient 
daughter has no father to obey; the figure of Jephthah’s daughter has no father to accept her 
sacrifice. Ophelia is left adrift, with neither the object for whom she renounced her desires nor 
the desired object she renounced, without the self she obediently effaced, without even the 
expected telos of sacrificial, and thereby sacred, death.  
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 By Act Four, Scene Five, Ophelia can only express her griefs indirectly, speaking 
through allusions and fantasies that she forces the other characters to interpret. Hers, like 
Hamlet’s, is a riddling madness, that refuses to speak directly and thus obliges witnesses to 
construe its possible causes or cause.35 Her song, “Tomorrow is Saint Valentine’s” (4.5.48–66) 
makes explicit Polonius’s fearful projections, the “wrack” (2.1.110) of the maiden’s lost 
virginity. While one popular stream of criticism construes the Saint Valentine’s song as evidence 
that Hamlet and Ophelia have had sex, its narrative of seduction and abandonment does not fit 
Hamlet’s plot; the play clearly represents Ophelia, not Hamlet, ending the courtship. Instead, 
Ophelia sings her father’s and brother’s fears. The cruel irony is that the result of Polonius’s 
warning proves far worse than what he feared. Ophelia has lost much, much more than her 
virginity. Thus the Saint Valentine’s song can also function as a fantasy of a road not taken, an 
expression of Ophelia’s renounced erotic desires, the sexual consummation that cannot be 
wished devoutly but must nonetheless be wished. Reading the song as erotic autobiography 
serves as a defense against the more frightening truth that sexual continence has been the source 
of disaster. (Even if one imagines Ophelia and Hamlet as consummating their relationship before 
the beginning of the play, the central problem of their love affair is its interruption.) Ophelia is 
not punished for breaking the rules, but for following them. She is punished for her virtue. 
Hamlet is the tragedy of the obedient child. 
 The theme of refusal is developed, allusively, in the enigmatic remark “They say the owl 
was a baker’s daughter” (4.5.42–43). Bakers’ daughters were proverbially loose, and on a basic 
level Ophelia is referring to an English folktale about a baker’s daughter transformed into an owl 
after refusing Jesus some bread.36 This baker’s daughter’s crime is not looseness but ungenerous 
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denial: a sin against “Saint Charity” which might hint at the refusal of a cherished lover. But the 
story’s transformation of the daughter into an owl would also suggest Ovidian associations to 
early modern auditors. The owl was of course sacred to the virginal Minerva, the chaste daughter 
perfectly obedient to her father Jove’s authority. And Ovid’s Metamorphoses tell an important 
parallel tale of a daughter’s transformation. Nyctimene, the King of Lesbos’s daughter, was 
either seduced or raped by her father and, overwhelmed by shame, refused to show her face. 
Minerva, taking pity, changed Nyctimene into a night bird, the first owl.37 Although Ophelia’s 
narrative arc has no classical or early-modern precedent, her story resonates in different ways 
with all three allusions: the withholding baker’s daughter, unyieldingly chaste Minerva, and 
Nyctimene the victim of an invasive father. 
 If Ophelia expresses her displaced erotic desires in song, Hamlet expresses his in silence, 
entering Ophelia’s chamber in partial undress not to plead his case but to perform inexplicable 
dumbshows. Ophelia reports that the lover to whom she had “denied ... access” (2.1.106–107) 
does not plead with her, but merely gives her “piteous” (2.1.79) looks. Hamlet enacts his distress 
and regret at the end of the relationship, but does not attempt to repair it. The final act Ophelia 
reports is Hamlet literally walking away from her without breaking his gaze, performing his 
reluctance to leave but actually leaving (2.1.93–97).  
If Hamlet ever expresses his repressed desires in other spheres, in terms of ambition and 
kingship, it is displaced into his strangely intense admiration for Fortinbras in the Second Quarto 
text. Many modern readers find Hamlet’s description of a “delicate and tender prince” moved by 
“divine ambition” (4.4.47–48) jarring, with recent editors protesting that these “seem 
inappropriate adjectives to apply to Fortinbras” and concluding that “Perhaps the underlying 
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problem is that Hamlet insists on admiring Fortinbras.”38 Fortinbras has frequently been figured 
in production as Hamlet’s foreboding, unpalatable opposite, an anti-Hamlet bereft of the beloved 
hero’s moral introspection, with the source of Hamlet’s surprisingly insistent admiration going 
unexplored. But early modern audiences would not necessarily have viewed a prince who 
renounces his revenge as Hamlet’s moral inferior. And it may be precisely because Fortinbras is 
an anti-Hamlet that Hamlet admires him. Forgoing revenge liberates Fortinbras to pursue other 
ends and live upon his own behalf. Fortinbras moves into active, independent manhood and 
finally achieves the natural telos for a character of his type, kingship. He becomes a figure of the 
possibilities Hamlet has abjured. And it is Fortinbras who remarks on the soldier and king that 
Hamlet might have been, how “he was likely, had he been put on, / To have proved most royal” 
(5.2.381–82). Hamlet sees in Fortinbras, as Fortinbras sees in Hamlet, the life Hamlet sacrifices 
to his father. 
 Ophelia has no parallel figure upon whom to displace her regrets. Hamlet offers no other 
female characters except the Queen, whose place as “the beauteous majesty of Denmark” 
(4.5.21) might have become Ophelia’s. But Ophelia afflicts the Queen. While some critics, 
including Reinhard and Lupton, insist on identifying these two characters with one another in 
Act Four, their putative resemblance is at its weakest, since one is mad and one is sane.39 
Ophelia and the Queen no more resemble one another in Act Four than Hamlet and the King 
resemble one another, and also no less. Indeed, Ophelia’s relationship to the Queen in Act Four 
clearly parallels that of Hamlet to the King. Ophelia’s madness transforms her into Hamlet, an 
imitation or emulation of the love object she can neither abandon nor abide. Hamlet and 
Ophelia’s madnesses differ in superficial expression, just as Neely and Showalter have 
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established, but are structurally alike. Ophelia wanders Elsinore disheveled, with the disarray of 
her hair rather than her garments signifying the gender difference. She expresses her madness in 
riddling provocations, singing where the masculine Hamlet reads. And Ophelia clearly “serves as 
a double for Hamlet during his absence” in Act Four, discomforting the court and plaguing the 
conscience of its monarch.40 As a woman, she focuses her torments on the Queen’s conscience 
while Hamlet provoked the King’s. Ophelia has become the beloved she may no longer love. 
 But Ophelia goes a step further. In a revision of René Girard’s theory of triangular and 
mimetic desire, Ophelia progresses from emulating her desired object to emulating the rival 
object whom her own object desires. In Girard’s classic formulation, first outlined in his Deceit, 
Desire, and the Novel, the lover pursues the beloved of an emulated rival, becoming ever more 
like that rival.41 Ophelia instead imitates first her own beloved and then the object her beloved 
emulates. First she becomes Hamlet, and then she becomes the person Hamlet loves most of all: 
the Ghost. Ophelia’s ambiguous death leaves her, like Hamlet’s father, a departed soul in a 
doubtful and possibly damned state, deprived of her full funeral rites and thus, by conventional 
presumption, a perturbed spirt. In so doing, Ophelia manages to gain Hamlet’s undivided, 
uncontested attention. He is finally free to proclaim his love for Ophelia, histrionically and to 
excess. 
 Ophelia’s drowning resolves the play’s central emotional triangle, that of Hamlet, 
Ophelia, and the Ghost, collapsing the three figures into a miserably unified trinity. And in the 
final acts, other characters play out similar mimetic triangulation, emulating their own lost love 
objects’ lost love objects. Laertes, having lost his sister Ophelia, becomes a simulation or 
semblance of Hamlet, a masculine revenge figure. Gertrude, taking her fatal drink, makes herself 
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over in the image of Ophelia, her son’s lost beloved: perhaps a suicide and perhaps an accident, 
another soul in mortal doubt. Julia Reinhard Lupton and Kenneth Reinhard have pointed out how 
Gertrude’s cry “The drink! The drink!” (5.2.295) echoes the “drink” that pulls Ophelia “to 
muddy death” (4.7.179, 181), but the conflation here comes from the Queen’s own language in 
both examples; it is Gertrude whose words identify her with Ophelia, who proposes herself as 
Ophelia’s double and surrogate.42  
 Ophelia is swiftest and best at this game of triangular mimesis, and thereby beats Hamlet 
at his own game. He has, throughout the tragedy, been moving steadily toward his own 
emulation and identification with the Ghost; Ophelia gets to Hamlet’s goal first. Hamlet’s inner 
conflicts are resolved when he stands, like his father, armed but already slain, in a state of sin, 
permitted to walk the stage for a certain term but with his hour almost come, no reckoning made 
but sent to his account with all his imperfections on his head. Hamlet, poisoned in the act of 
murderous revenge, no longer chooses between his father and himself, life and revenge; he 
avenges both his father’s life and his own. Hamlet has, at last, become Hamlet’s Ghost.   
 Mortally wounded, Hamlet assumes his independent political authority for the first time, 
giving Fortinbras his “dying voice” (5.2.340) as next king. In so doing, Hamlet endorses the 
figure of his own disavowed potential; Fortinbras represents the obverse of Hamlet’s choice, 
renouncing revenge in exchange for life and the continuation of the family dynasty. Hamlet’s 
dying vote also serves to end Hamlet’s own dynastic line, moving the crown outside his 
extinguished bloodline. This, too, is in keeping with what Senecan specters command. Hamlet’s 
dying voice endorses the choice he did not make, the future self he disavowed, even as it 
cements his final allegiance to the Ghost.  
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